Abstract-Some scholars have argued that globalization should pressure firms to adopt the most efficient form of corporate governance; others maintain that such convergence will not occur because of path dependence. We find robust evidence that economically interdependent countries have similar corporate governance laws protecting stakeholders. In contrast, we find virtually no relationship between corporate governance practices and globalization in a battery of estimations at the country, industry, and firm levels. We conclude that globalization may have induced the adoption of some common corporate governance standards but these standards may not have been implemented.
I. Introduction
E conomists have studied convergence for a long time. Most of this work has focused on convergence in national income levels (Solow, 1956; Baumol, 1986; Romer, 1986; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Mankiw, 1995) . Recently, however, scholars have also directed attention to the microeconomic foundations of such convergence. In particular, the question being asked is whether or not increased global integration of markets is prompting convergence in the institutional foundations of economies (North, 1994) . The idea that increasingly stringent global competition should increase the likelihood of convergence to efficient institutional arrangements has some intuitive appeal and has been investigated in a historical context (BenDavid, 1993; Williamson, 1996) .
One set of institutional arrangements that has been scrutinized is related to the governance of corporations. The number of standards-setting bodies and multilateral institutions that have been set up in recent times to foster good corporate governance worldwide is testimony to the heightened interest in this particular issue. These include the International Corporate Governance Network, the International Accounting Standards Committee, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions, to name but a few. The OECD and the World Bank have issued guidelines for global principles of good corporate governance and promote the dissemination of these guidelines (OECD, 2000; World Bank, 2001 ). This cottage industry of efforts received a fillip in the wake of recent financial crises, when at least some fingers were pointed at corporate governance problems.
Theorists have joined the debate with gusto. Some, espousing faith in the efficiency-enhancing aspects of competition (especially in the capital markets), aver that there will be complete convergence. This position is exemplified by Hansmann and Kraakmann (2001) in a paper entitled "The End of History for Corporate Law." Others take the polar opposite view that the irresistible force of global competition will meet the immovable object of path dependence. Even if there could be agreement on what constitutes an optimal corporate governance system, there are too many complementarities in economic systems for unstinting evolution toward the optimal corporate governance system (Aoki, 1994; Bebchuk & Roe, 1999) . 1 Further, vested interests might well oppose such an evolution (Olson, 1971) . Finally, advocates of adherence to various sets of minimal standards as being the only feasible outcome are implicitly signaling belief in partial convergence (Eichengreen, 1999) .
These arguments virtually run the gamut of possibilities. Yet there is no empirical work on whether there is convergence in corporate governance systems of any sort, nor any on the association of globalization with this phenomenon. Presumably this is partly because of the nontrivial nature of the question. At some level, it is hard to dispute that there is convergence. For example, there is probably some convergence to acceptance of the idea that resource providers should be protected, but much less to whether the resource providers in question should be primarily shareholders or include other stakeholders as well (Berglof & von Thadden, 1994; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Tirole, 2001) . Similarly, there is probably near-complete convergence to the idea that good information is needed for good corporate governance, but much less convergence on whether financial markets or banks are the best targets for such information. Finally, Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) argue that several features of the modern corporate form are nearly universally adopted, 2 but it is hard to imagine that there is convergence on the actions taken by managers even in the convergent legal structures that such firms represent. 3 Scholars have made an attempt to account for such subtleties by distinguishing between convergence in "form" and convergence in "function." The latter arises because different institutional arrangements in different countries have sufficient plasticity to enable them to achieve similar economic ends (Gilson, 2001) . There is also ambiguity as to the system toward which convergence might occur. The système du jour is the U.S. shareholder-centered one, though other systems have found favor in the not very distant past (Berglof & Perotti, 1994; Porter, 1992) .
Empirical issues compound these theoretical conundrums. First, looking purely at rules on the books as indicators of corporate governance practices is unlikely to be sufficient, even though it is one indicator (Pistor, Raiser, & Gelfer, 2000) . It could be that formal rules are circumvented in the all too common absence of good enforcement-a familiar phenomenon in many developing countries. Much less common, but quite possible, is the idea that particular firms might well exceed the rules of their country of domicile in a bid to gain economic advantage (Blass & Yafeh, 2001; . Thus attention to intracountry variation is necessary. Second, consistent cross-country data on the multiple aspects of corporate governanceboard structure, compensation practices, disclosure, and transparency, to name but a few-have traditionally been difficult to come by.
We attempt to fill this empirical void partially by analyzing a variety of new data sets. A number of private-sector organizations have recently started collecting firm-level data on corporate governance practices. This phenomenon is itself evidence of convergence in that it demonstrates a belief on the part of at least some organizations that institutional investors are willing to pay for corporate governance information. We focus primarily on year-2000 data obtained from Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) on corporate governance practices covering 24 developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and eastern Europe, and data on laws protecting shareholders and creditors from La Porta et al. (1998) . 4 Finally, we develop a host of measures of globalization of capital markets, but depart from the theoretical literature's usual focus solely on capital markets to consider competitive forces emanating from global markets for products and talent.
An important feature of our estimation technique-examining similarities in governance among pairs of countries rather than treating the individual country governance regime as the unit of analysis-is that it avoids normative assumptions regarding the optimality of a particular governance regime, a stance vindicated by the continued theoretical debate on this issue. We choose to let the data speak rather than impose our priors on the data.
But our analysis has two important limitations worth highlighting. First, lacking time series data, we are unable to test convergence in a literal sense. Rather, our tests are about correlations between globalization and similarity in corporate governance practices at a point in time. It is thus possible that convergence is occurring but that the de facto practices today do not allow us to see this process. Second, we do not say much about causality. We cannot distinguish between the possibility that the flows of global factors and products force changes in corporate governance and the possibility that the adoption of uniform corporate governance systems gives globalization a boost.
We summarize our results as follows. We find strong evidence that de jure similarity in governance is correlated with several of our proxies for globalization. These proxies are not limited to those that measure capital market integration. Further, the de jure results are not driven by similarity with U.S. corporate governance. Rather, pairs of economically interlinked countries display similarity to each others' systems, especially if both countries are economically developed. Finally, we find virtually no evidence of de facto similarity. An interpretation is that, even though countries might mimic the tenets of each others' systems, their implementation is subject to significant lags.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the literature on convergence in corporate governance. Section III introduces the governance ratings, covering selection effects, and reliability issues. It also motivates and describes the independent variables we will use in our analysis. Section IV discusses the methodology of the country-level analysis and presents the results. Section V confirms the country-level results using additional data sources and tests at the industry and firm levels. Section VI concludes.
II. The Literature on Convergence in Corporate Governance
Globalization entails a lifting of barriers to the mobility of capital, products, and labor, leading to an intensification of competition for these factors across borders by firms and 2 They emphasize full legal personality, limited liability, shared ownership by investors, board structure, and transferable shares. A similar argument is made regarding the organization of nation-states by Meyer et al. (1997) . They conduct the interesting thought experiment: How would world society treat a hypothetical country that newly emerged on the world stage? They aver that several aspects of societal organization in such a nascent country would mirror arrangements commonly found elsewhere, that is, that there would be convergence.
3 Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan (2004) find some evidence that disclosure regimes of foreign companies (a facet of governance practices) converge in response to exposure to U.S. markets. But this convergence is far from complete, and other facets of managerial practices do not appear to converge as much . 4 These data, and supplementary data that we use from Déminor and Proxinvest, have not been used in academic work, to the best of our knowledge. Black's (2001) data source differs from our own. He finds a strong relationship between the market value of Russian firms and the corporate governance rating they received from UBS Brunswick Warburg.
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countries. Just as U.S. states competed for most of the twentieth century for franchise tax revenues by offering the best terms for incorporation (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991; Romano, 1993) , 5 nations could compete for firms and resources by creating the most efficient corporate governance environment. 6 Proponents of the convergence hypothesis tend to highlight the role of global capital flows in eliminating inefficient forms of governance. 7 They aver that convergence is hastened by a realization that alternatives to U.S.-style shareholder-centered governance have generally not succeeded. Several multilateral bodies are spurring on this process by urging the adoption of common standards (OECD, 2000; World Bank, 2001 ).
An aspect of the convergence debate recognized but not emphasized in the literature is the distinction between de jure and de facto convergence. De jure convergence is the adoption of similar corporate governance laws across countries. De facto convergence, on the other hand, refers to a convergence of actual practices. Put simply, nations may formally adopt other countries' corporate governance systems, but the acceptance of the enshrined principles may significantly lag their codification. This may be for several reasons, including a lack of understanding of what is implied by good corporate governance, absence of complementary institutions needed to implement the principles, or simply poor enforcement (Pistor et al., 2000) . One contribution of our paper is to empirically demonstrate a distinction between these two types of convergence across a large sample of countries.
There are three categories of explanations for why de facto convergence may lag de jure convergence: path dependence, multiple optima, and rent-seeking by interest groups. According to the path dependence perspective, initial historical conditions matter in determining the corporate governance structures that are prevalent today. Central to the idea of path dependence are complementarities, also called indivisibilities (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999; Bratton & McCahery, 1999; Schmidt & Spindler, 2002) . Corporate governance results from a system of complementary institutions, legal rules, and practices where improving any one element independently may actually hurt efficiency. Thus the main bank monitoring system that historically held sway in Japan depended for its functioning on the existence of particular labor market practices (Aoki, 1994) and patterns of equity cross-holdings among firms (Berglof & Perotti, 1994) . Sunk adaptive costs and positive network externalities from the use of the same governance practices by all firms in a country make switching more costly and prevent unilateral governance changes by any one firm or institution.
Even in the absence of path dependence, complementarities induce multiple optima, so that nations, even unburdened by historical constraints, may well choose different bundles of practices that yield equivalent long-run corporate governance. 8 Believers in such a view of the world disagree with the idea that the U.S. model is the one optimal governance model. Not very long ago the Japanese model held pride of place in the minds of academics and practitioners (Porter, 1992) . In particular, the U.S. model was criticized at the time for three failures relative to the Japanese system-agency costs arising from differences in managers' and shareholders' agendas, time-horizon costs due to the reliance of distant shareholders on short-term performance, and industrial organization costs caused by the bureaucracy in vertical organizations that could have been lessened in the presence of strong financial intermediation (Roe, 1996) . It is more likely that there are tradeoffs between the systems and that each has costs and benefits suited to different circumstances (Bhide, 1993) . Consistent with the idea that there is no universally optimal model, research on the effects of corporate governance on performance has produced ambiguous results (see, for example, Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Thomsen & Pederson, 1996; Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001) .
The force of path dependence leads some theorists, primarily legal theorists interested in the foundations of financial markets, to draw a distinction between convergence in form and convergence in function. Formal convergence predicts a convergence of legal rules and institutions, whereas functional convergence predicts adaptations within different existing institutions to perform the functions of good corporate governance. Proponents of functional convergence would argue that different institutions are equally capable of performing corporate governance functions such as ensuring management accountability. 9 To the extent that it is possible, it is much less costly to improve corporate performance by working within the current institutions than by creating new institutions. Thus, the initial response to the competitive forces of globalization should be functional rather than formal convergence (Gilson, 2001) . 5 There is some disagreement on whether competition between states has led to a race to the top or a race to the bottom. For example, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2002) showed empirically that state competition has worked poorly in takeover regulation.
6 Although most industrial nations do not permit reincorporation across countries such as the U.S. allows between states, firms are able to opt into particular regulatory regimes by listing on foreign stock exchanges. In the case of Centros, the court ruled that a Danish company could incorporate in the United Kingdom even though it had no intention of doing business in the United Kingdom and simply wanted to avoid the minimum capital requirement for Danish incorporation. See European Court of Justice, March 9, 1999, C. 21/297, as cited in Gilson (2001) .
7 have demonstrated the role of global talent markets and global product markets in fostering some corporate governance convergence in the global software industry. 8 See Kauffman (1993) for an early articulation of this from evolutionary biology, and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for an adaptation to economics.
9 See Merton (1968, "Chapter 1: Manifest and Latent Functions") for an early description of functional analysis in sociology. Crane, Bodie, and Perold (1995) is a more recent example of functional analysis as applied to financial systems. Kaplan (1994) has provided some econometric evidence for functional convergence for a particular aspect of corporate governance. Statistically, poorly performing CEOs appear equally likely to be dismissed in the United States, Germany, and Japan, despite the very different formal systems in place.
Even if there were a single universally optimal corporate governance system, political resistance would pose a major obstacle to governance reform. Because the benefits of improved corporate governance are not distributed evenly, an increase in social welfare that exceeds switching costs would not guarantee the adoption of better practices. This is an idea dating back at least to Olson (1971) . Interest groups such as labor unions, banks, controlling shareholders, and lawyers may sabotage governance reform (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999; Coffee, 1999) . U.S.-style governance based on individualism may also conflict with values and anti-Western sentiment found in many developing countries (Branson, 2001) .
Despite these ongoing debates, there is exceedingly little empirical work, and none that confronts the nexus between globalization and corporate governance convergence that is the topic of this paper. 10
III. Data
We use primarily two data sources on corporate governance practices across a number of countries. Laws-on-thebooks indicators collected by La Porta et al. (1998) (LLSV) represent indicators of de jure governance. A firm-level survey completed by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), when aggregated to the country level, provides ratings on de facto governance. Even though much of our analysis ends up using the LLSV data, we describe the CLSA data in detail. This is because it is new to academic analysis, and because our inability to detect de facto convergence must be judged within the constraints of the quality of the CLSA data. Our independent variables are proxies for country-level exposure to global capital, product, and labor markets. An advantage of these data is that they are collected objectively. There is little uncertainty regarding whether or not a particular law exists within a country. La Porta et al. (1998) also identify the origin of the legal system of each of their countries-English, French, German, or Scandinavian-which we use as a measure of path dependence in some of our estimations.
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA): In April 2001, CLSA released a large study of corporate governance entitled "Saints & Sinners: Who's Got Religion?" which reviewed corporate governance at the firm level in 25 emerging markets. A firm's corporate governance score is based on responses to 57 yes-no questions about various aspects of governance. CLSA's research analysts completed the questionnaire for 495 companies over a six-week period ending March 2001. Of these 57 questions, 70% are based on objective facts, and the remaining 30% require some interpretation by the analyst but still must be resolved as a yes or no answer. In cases where information was not available or evidence was lacking, analysts were instructed to answer negatively. In as much as a lack of corporate governance information should be correlated with poor corporate governance, this practice should not lead to large errors. The CLSA questionnaire is divided into seven sections covering fiscal discipline, accounting transparency and disclosure, board independence, board accountability, responsibility, equitable treatment of shareholders, and social awareness. The score for each of the seven sections is simply the percentage of questions receiving a yes answer in that section.
Note that the absolute value of the CLSA score for a company, therefore, effectively measures proximity to the Anglo-Saxon system of governance (where, for example, there is greater disclosure to outside parties and boards are composed of independent outsiders), rather than proximity to alternative relationship-based governance systems.
Further, because the firm-level data are about actual practices, rather than laws on books, these data address de facto rather than de jure convergence. A disadvantage of these data, relative to the de jure measures, is that the CLSA data cover only developing countries, whereas the laws-onthe-books indicators span both developed and developing markets (in Europe, Asia, and Latin America).
By averaging the scores across all firms within a country, we obtain de facto governance scores at the country level. The aggregation of firm-level practices to the country level is validated by the existence of a strong country component in firm governance scores. We have shown, using Hotelling generalized means tests, that there exist statistically significant differences between the means of firm governance practices in pairs of countries. Furthermore, we found that firms located in the same country tend to have similar governance practices, and this effect was statistically significant at the 1% level.
The most significant limitation of the CLSA data is that they are based on subjective opinions. Although research analysts rather than firms complete a detailed and methodical questionnaire, for some of the questions the analysts must rely on information provided to them by the firms they are rating. Because firms are asked to provide information about their corporate governance, a substantial amount of misreporting can be expected. Misreporting can lead to noisy data, and, even worse, if firms with poor governance were more likely to misreport, then the ratings would not measure the strength of governance at all. The reliance on intermediaries such as consulting firms and investment banks to interpret the data and generate the ratings may also lead to biases. These intermediaries are hardly disinterested parties, and in some cases they are rating firms that may be their clients.
We handle these reliability issues in two ways. First, the thesis of CLSA's "Saints & Sinners: Who's Got Religion?" is that corporate governance is correlated with performance. We have confirmed that CLSA's governance ratings are correlated with firm P/E ratios. 12 Although we are not able to determine the direction of causation, the correlation of corporate governance ratings with investors' valuations of the firm suggests that the ratings are capturing a real and relevant variable. Second, as described in appendix A, we generate our own ratings of egregious corporate governance problems based on public sources only, avoiding some of the biases present in the other ratings. Based on business newspaper and magazine articles, we compiled a list of firms with reported instances of minority shareholder expropriation in the last two and a half years, and other kinds of corporate governance problems. Because compiling such data is highly labor-intensive, we focused the collection efforts only on firms in India, the emerging market for which CLSA provided data on the largest number of firms.
We find that the CLSA rating is correlated with our index of minority shareholder exploitation (but not as strongly with other corporate governance problems). It appears as though the CLSA index does capture major governance problems.
We also check CLSA's sample selection procedure. According to CLSA, the sample of firms was selected based on two criteria: size and investor interest. " [B] eyond the largest stocks in each market, our coverage would be biased towards companies that we see as likely to be of interest to institutional investors and in making this decision, an inherent sampling bias creeps in." If investor interest were correlated with corporate governance, then the portion of the sample that was selected after the largest firms would be biased toward well-governed firms, and larger firms in the CLSA sample would appear to have poorer corporate governance. We test the determinants of selection empirically by focusing on the selection of firms in India, to ease the data-gathering process. We use Bloomberg to generate a pool of firms from which the CLSA analysts could have selected. Appendix B describes a probit analysis of the determinants of CLSA firm selection in this pool. This analysis confirms that firms were selected based on size and investor interest, as CLSA claims.
Finally, for the bulk of our analysis, we aggregate the firm-level CLSA governance ratings for all firms within a country, along each of the dimensions captured by the data. We use the average ratings thus generated as country-level indicators of the particular facets of corporate governance (disclosure, transparency, board independence, and so on), the analogs to the country-level de jure indicators in the LLSV data. This process averages out at least some of the idiosyncratic subjectivity in responses, though obviously it does not remove country-level response biases.
B. Independent Variables Used in Estimations
Our country-level regressors try to capture the degree of capital market, product market, and labor market integration between pairs of countries. Factor price equalization provides one theoretically defensible measure of the extent to which two markets are integrated. 13 Though we do not actually have such measures, we use two approximations. The first pertains to a measure of the correlation in wage structure in pairs of countries, the second to comovement in equity prices. Of course, such correlations might well be induced by common unobservables that have nothing to do with true market integration.
Accordingly, we also examine quantity rather than price measures of integration, using measures of both actual and potential flows between countries. Competitive pressure in markets is transmitted through such flows. For example, trade flows or simply the threat of trade flows from abroad puts pressure on domestic firms to be more efficient. Similarly, the potential for capital flows should make countries and firms more likely to reform governance in order to attract this capital. Our measures of actual flows include pairwise trade in products and pairwise foreign direct investment (FDI). Our measures of potential flows include geographic distance and the presence of a common language.
A variable denoting the origin of the legal system is used to control for path dependence. If path dependence is indeed a force in the evolution of corporate governance within a country, then the starting point should have an effect on the current corporate governance laws and practices. La Porta et al. (1998) found that the origin of the legal system is a significant determinant of current legal structure. We treat the origin of the legal system as a proxy for the starting point because it was determined exogenously many years ago. 14 If the origin of the legal system is the only historical factor relevant in determining current legal systems, then our test for similarity becomes a test for convergence as well. 15 We motivate and describe the independent variables in greater detail below.
Wage Equalization: Under conditions of perfect labor mobility, workers of a particular skill level, ability, or occupation should receive the same wage across countries after controlling for differences in the cost of living. Until recently, no systematic data on wages across countries were available. Freeman and Oostendorp (2001) have refined the ILO international database of wages to create a data set of monthly average pay for male workers coded for 161 occupations across 154 countries over the years 1983 to 1998. 16 Because each country had data available for different years and different occupations and the data are presented in current local currency units, we cannot simply compare wage rates by occupation across countries. Instead, we examine the structure of wages by calculating the correlation of wages by occupation across country pairs. 17 If wages are equalized, then we expect a correlation coefficient of 1; for example, if doctors earn more than lawyers in one country, then they would earn more than lawyers in the 13 Similarly, a lack of equalization in the prices of capital and labor would indicate the presence of barriers to the mobility of these factors. However, the converse of this statement is not necessarily true. We know from international trade theory that factor price equalization may occur when factors are not mobile but products are. [See, for example, Samuelson (1948) for an early version of this idea.] 14 Rajan and Zingales (2003) have argued against such an interpretation, however.
15 To see this, assume that the origin of the legal system entirely determines the starting point of the corporate governance environment. The LLSV and CLSA data represent the current corporate governance environment. In this way, we implicitly have data on corporate governance for each country at two points in time. This information allows us to estimate whether corporate governance between pairs of countries is converging. 16 We are grateful to Remco Oostendorp for sharing these data with us. 17 The actual procedure is to first take an average of wages by occupation for all available years from 1983 to 1998 for each country. The correlation coefficient is calculated on a pairwise basis for all occupations for which both countries have reported data. This method has obvious limitations in that different pairs of countries have different occupations in common.
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other country as well. A drawback of this proxy is that wage structure may itself be an indicator of corporate governance separate from the effects of cross-country labor mobility; certain rankings of wages by occupation may result from a shareholder-centered system, and other rankings from a labor-centered system.
Capital Market Comovement:
A rough measure of economic integration is the correlation of weekly stock market index changes in percentage terms between two countries. By definition, movement in stock prices is caused by either a change in fundamentals or a change in discount rate. If an economic shock occurs in one country and the two countries are economically interdependent, then the shock will also affect the other country. Because fundamentals in both countries are affected, the stock prices of both countries should move in the same direction. Alternatively, if two countries have the same set of investors, then the discount rates in the two countries will move together and the stock markets will be correlated. In this case, comovement becomes a proxy for integration of two countries into a single capital market. 18 Stock price data come from the Morgan Stanley stock indices, and, for a few countries where a Morgan Stanley index was not available, from the national indices. Most countries had data available for the period January 1993 to August 2001, but in a few cases shorter time series were used.
We intentionally measure correlation rather than causation for this variable for reasons that the following examples clarify. First, suppose Argentinean companies were to start raising money in Chile; external shocks to Chilean investors would then affect both Chilean and Argentinean markets. Although there is a causal link between the shock to Chilean investors and Argentina's capital market, there is no causal link between the Chilean and Argentinian stock markets. Second, suppose heavy snows in the mountains in Chile disrupt trucking routes with Argentina. Snow thus causes a decline in Chilean stock markets and in the Argentinean stock markets; however, there is no causation between Chilean and Argentinean stock markets. Again, the relevant proxy for economic integration is a correlation coefficient.
Trade: Flows of goods between two countries are indicative of openness between these countries, at least in product markets. The flow measures include both intraindustry and interindustry trade; although competitive pressures should be greater in cross-border horizontal competition, pressures in a vertical relationship are also possible. We develop two related measures. The first, Trade Partner, is appropriate if trade bears the same importance in the political process regardless of size, perhaps because of its potential for growth in the future. The second, Trade Magnitude, assumes that the importance of trade to political decision-makers is proportional to its current share in the economy. Trade Partner is the sum of the ratios IMP ij , IMP ji , EXP ij , and EXP ji , where IMP ij is the share of total imports into country i originating from country j, and EXP ij is the share of total exports of country i that are going to country j. Although this measure uses the same numerator twice, it provides the most complete measure of whether the two countries are major trading partners from either country's perspective. Trade Magnitude takes into account the fact that international trade plays a larger role in some economies than others. For example, trade varies with the degree of openness. Furthermore, for a given level of openness, trade is more important for a small country than for a large country. Trade Magnitude is defined as the sum of pairwise total trade divided by the GDP of the first country and the same total trade divided by the GDP of the second country. The pairwise trade data come from the World Trade Analyzer for 1996.
Foreign Direct Investment: Pairwise FDI can proxy for pressures for convergence of corporate governance in several ways. Multinationals might operate more efficiently than local firms because of their access to home-country institutions-capital, talent, or technology, for example. Competitive forces from the multinationals would then force local firms to abandon inefficient corporate governance structures (Foley, 2002 Geographic Distance and Common Language: Geographic distance and common language predict the likelihood of flows between countries. We expect countries that are located closer together to have lower transport costs and smaller information acquisition costs, facilitating the flows of goods and factors. Similarly, flows between countries are aided by the presence of a common language between the two countries. These two variables have been extensively used in the literature on gravity models in international trade. Of course, geography and language might well proxy for other underlying variables (Acemoglu, Robinson, & Johnson, 2001; Diamond, 1999) . Data are from the atlas and from the CIA World Factbook.
IV. Similarity at the Country Level
We test the hypothesis that the corporate governance environment in a particular country will be affected by that country's integration into worldwide capital markets, product markets, and labor markets. We make no assumptions regarding which country has the optimal governance system and which other countries will try to emulate it, and instead test a general version of the hypothesis. Economic linkages between any two countries are hypothesized to create competitive pressure in each of the two countries to adopt the optimal elements of its partner's governance structure. Thus, pairs of countries with greater economic linkages should have more similar governance structures. 19 We perform the estimations first using the de jure governance data and then using the de facto data. We explore the de jure results in detail to understand which pairs of countries are driving the results.
A. Methodology
We use the thirteen indicators of legal rules from the LLSV data to construct a measure of de jure governance similarity between two countries i and j as follows:
where C i,l represents a particular binary legal characteristic l of country i. The analogous measure of de facto similarity using the CLSA data is
where C i,l represents a 1-to-10 rating of the strength of protection in country i for dimension l. For each possible pair of countries, we regress these dependent variables on eight measures of pairwise economic integration: wage correlation, capital market comovement, FDI partner, FDI magnitude, trade partner, trade magnitude, geographic distance, and common language. We use the quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) as described in appendix C to calculate standard errors for such dyadic data (Krackhardt, 1988) . Because the independent variables are correlated and, in many instances, meant to proxy for the same type of integration, we test the effect of each of these separately. We distinguish between the effects of integration and historical path dependence by controlling for common origin of legal system. We also control for differences in level of development on the grounds that governance is expected to differ between developed and developing countries. Less developed countries do not have the resources or expertise to refine corporate governance laws and practices. Because the level of economic integration may differ between developed-developing and the developed-developed and developing-developing pairs, this control eliminates a potential omitted variable bias.
B. De Jure Analysis
We find a strong correlation between economic integration and de jure governance similarity. Table 2 displays the baseline regressions. All of the globalization proxies are of the expected sign, and five of the variables (wage correlation, trade partner, trade magnitude, geographic distance, and common language) are significant at the 10%, 5%, or even 1% level. The predicted magnitude of the effect, expressed as the percentage-of-a-standard-deviation change in the dependent variable resulting from a standarddeviation change in the independent variable, ranges from 8% to 29% for the variables that were significant. Common origin of the legal system is of the expected sign and significant at the 1% level in all regressions. Difference in development is of the expected sign in all but one of the regressions, but is not significant. We have also performed this analysis for shareholder rights and creditor rights separately. We find a link between integration and similarity for both of types of governance, though the results for shareholder rights are stronger.
Which pairs of countries are driving the results? We first test whether the results are driven by integration with the United States and similarity to its governance. We create two new independent variables to replace each independent variable used in the baseline regression. The first independent variable equals the proxy for integration when the pair contains the United States and equals 0 otherwise. The second independent variable equals the proxy for integration when the pair does not contain the United States and equals 0 otherwise.
Contrary to expectations, the regression analysis of the effects of these new independent variables (panel B1) reveals that U.S. pairs are not driving the results. For U.S. pairs, only three of the eight variables are of the expected sign, and only one of these three is significant (and merely 19 Our methodology is distinct from the gravity equation of international trade (see, for example, Anderson, 1979; Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995; Evenett and Keller, 2002) , which predicts that the volume of trade between two countries is proportional to the product of the two countries 9 GDPs. We do, however, use some similar independent variables in our regressions, such as geographic distance and common language. Our approach is similar in spirit to Mukand and Rodrik's (2002) model, in which countries, in the course of their search for optimal policies, may adopt the policies of "leaders." In their empirical implementation, using data from postsocialist countries, they probe the relationship between adoption of western European institutions and geographic distance (a proxy for institutional distance) from western Europe. Each row represents a separate univariate dyadic regression utilizing one of eight proxies for pairwise economic integration as the explanatory variable. All regressions control for pairwise differences in log GDP per capita and for common origin of legal systems. The dependent variable in all regressions is the distance in corporate governance between two countries, which is calculated as the sum of differences along thirteen dimensions of creditor and shareholder rights with data from La Porta et al. (1998) . The sample is all possible pairs of countries for which we have governance and pairwise economic integration data. The expected sign in the second column is based on the hypothesis that more economic integration leads to a smaller "distance" in governance.
Parentheses contain percentile distributions of the actual coefficient within coefficients under the null hypothesis generated from a QAP simulation with 500 draws. A percentile less than 5% or greater than 95%, for example, indicates a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. Magnitude, in the columns so labeled, is calculated as the coefficient on the independent variable multiplied by that variable's standard deviation and then divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. Each row represents a dyadic regression where the independent variable from the baseline regressions in panel A has been replaced by two independent variables, which separate the effects between U.S. pairs and non-U.S. pairs. The first independent variable equals the underlying proxy for integration when the pair contains the United States, and 0 otherwise. The second independent variable equals the proxy for integration when the pair does not contain the United States, and 0 otherwise. Each row represents a dyadic regression where the independent variable from the baseline regressions in panel A has been replaced by two independent variables, which contrast the effects in all pairs and non-U.S. pairs. The first independent variable equals the underlying proxy for integration. The second independent variable equals the proxy for integration when the pair does not contain the United States, and equals 0 otherwise. A statistically significant coefficient for this second variable indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the effect of this variable for U.S. and non-U.S. pairs. Each row represents a dyadic regression where the independent variable from the baseline regressions in panel A has been replaced by two independent variables, which separate the effects of integration between regions and within regions. The first independent variable equals the underlying proxy for integration when the observation is for two countries located in the same region, and equals 0 otherwise. The second independent variable equals the proxy for integration when the observation is for two countries located in different regions, and equals 0 otherwise. Each row represents a dyadic regression where the independent variable from the baseline regressions in panel A has been replaced by three independent variables, which separate the effects of integration into three categories: developed-developed, developing-developing, and developed-developing. The first independent variable equals the underlying proxy for integration when the observation is for two developed countries. The second independent variable equals the proxy for integration when the observation is for two developing countries, and equals 0 otherwise. The third independent variable equals the proxy for integration when the observation is for a developed and a developing country, and equals 0 otherwise.
E1. Robustness Check, Controlling for European Unobservables Independent Variable
Expected Sign
Indep.-Variable Coeff.
Diff.-in Log-GDP/cap. Coeff. This panel shows the baseline regression with an additional control variable: a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when a dyad consists of two European countries and equal to 0 otherwise. U.S. pairs are excluded from the analysis.
at the 10% level). The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for U.S. pairs for all variables except for geographic distance are relatively small and in the range of 0 to 4%. In contrast, for the case of the non-U.S. pairs, all the variables are of the expected sign, and all except for capital market correlation are significant, with five of the variables significant at the 1% level. For all variables, the magnitude of the predicted effect for non-U.S. pairs is equal to or larger than the magnitude for the U.S. pairs. Because the U.S. pair coefficients are estimated using a small number of observations with essentially nondyadic data, these coefficients are not strictly comparable to non-U.S. coefficients.
We repeat the analysis using a more robust test (panel B2). We generate two independent variables. The first always equals the proxy for integration. The second equals the proxy for integration for non-U.S. pairs and equals 0 for U.S. pairs. A statistically significant coefficient for the second independent variable would indicate that there is a statistically significant difference in the effect of that variable between U.S. and non-U.S. pairs. We find three of these second variables to be significant, two at the 10% level and one at the 5% level. The overall results provide strong evidence that U.S. pairs are not alone driving the findings of the baseline regressions, and weak evidence that there is no similarity to U.S. standards.
If U.S. pairs are not driving the results, then to what model of governance are countries converging? It appears that there is no single model. Rather, countries tend to have governance similar to those of regional partners. We demonstrate this pattern using a methodology similar to that described above for the United States. We generate two independent variables, one for integration within regions and the other for integration across regions, such that the former variable is 0 when the pairs are not in the same region and the latter is 0 when the pairs are in the same region. We are thus able to estimate coefficients for the effects of integration within regions and then separate coefficients for the effects of integration across regions. As shown in panel C, the results for within-region integration are much stronger, in terms of both the significance of the coefficients and the magnitudes of the predicted effects. This regionalization of governance is consistent with the previous result that convergence is not driven by integration with the United States.
We also analyze the results according to level of development of the country pairs. Common wisdom is that convergence will occur because governance practices spread from developed countries with good governance to developed and developing countries with poor governance. Convergence between two developing countries is expected to be less likely. We divide the countries in our sample evenly into developed and developing countries according to GDP per capita and then group the pairs into three categories: developed-developed, developing-developing, and developed-developing. Panel D shows the coefficients for these regressions. The effects of integration are strongest, in terms of significance and magnitude of the coefficients, in the developed-developed pairs and weakest in the developing-developing, as expected.
A potential problem with the preceding analysis is the existence of unobservable variables that affect governance and are correlated with our measures of economic integration. Though we cannot reject all such unobservables, we do test for some of the more obvious ones to verify our results. For example, it is possible that there exists some unobservable factor that induces correlation among European countries even after controlling for legal origin. To test whether this unobservable might be responsible for all the results, we repeat the baseline regressions, adding as a control variable a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when both countries are European and equal to 0 otherwise. Inclusion of this dummy control variable should decrease the coefficients on our various proxies for economic integration, either because the dummy variable indeed is a control for some unobservable or because the dummy variable is itself a proxy for integration. We exclude U.S. pairs from the analysis, in view of the prior results. As shown in panel E1, this dummy variable is of the expected sign and statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels in all regressions. Despite this control, seven of the eight proxies for economic integration are of the expected sign, and five of these are statistically significant.
Though similarity in governance is present among European countries, this analysis shows that it is not the only case of similarity correlated with integration in our data. European countries are not the only ones whose governance might be affected by some regional unobservable factor. We generate a more general dummy control variable, which is equal to 1 if both countries in the dyad are in the same region and equal to 0 otherwise. As shown in panel E2, this regional dummy variable is always of the expected sign and statistically significant at the 1% level for seven of the eight regressions. Despite the inclusion of the regional dummy variable, seven of the eight proxies for integration are still of the expected sign, and four are statistically significant. Without time series data, we are unable to control for all possible unobservables, but the checks do assuage these concerns.
Factor Analysis: Our proxies for globalization are often highly correlated. Further, though it may seem that some of these proxies measure globalization of a particular kind of market-for example, a capital market-this is a tough case to make in practice. For example, FDI might be a proxy for any of capital, product, or labor market integration. If correlation of capital markets is due to common economic factors affecting the performance of firms in both countries, then this explanatory variable is a proxy for economic integration in general. Table 3 shows a factor analysis on the ten explanatory variables, retaining three factors. Factor 1 represents globalization, with heavy loadings on FDI, trade, and geographical distance. Factor 2 represents differences in development, with loadings on differences in log GNP per capita and capital market comovement. The presence of the latter variable in this factor suggests that the correlation within emerging markets or within developed markets is higher than the correlation between a developed country and a developing country [see Morck, Yeung, and Yu (1999) for a more detailed discussion of this pattern]. Factor 3 represents path dependence and contains common origin and common language. Whereas common language was intended to be a proxy for the ease of mobility of labor between two countries, it is easy to see how it would be highly correlated with common origin of the legal system and included in that factor. The wage correlation variable does not receive heavy weightings in any of the three retained factors. The regres- A factor analysis of the eight pairwise proxies for economic integration identifies three factors that are easily interpretable as globalization, difference in development, and common origin. These factors are then used in a multivariate dyadic regression. The dependent variable in all regressions is the distance in corporate governance between two countries, which is calculated as the sum of differences along thirteen dimensions of creditor and shareholder rights with data from La Porta et al. (1998) . The sample is all possible pairs of countries for which we have governance and all eight pairwise integration measures.
Parentheses contain percentile distributions of the actual coefficient within coefficients under the null hypothesis generated from a QAP simulation with 500 draws. A percentile less than 5% or greater than 95%, for example, indicates a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. Magnitude, in the columns so labeled, is calculated as the coefficient on the independent variable multiplied by that variable's standard deviation and then divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level.
sion of legal-rules differences on these three factors finds all coefficients of the expected sign, with common origin significant at the 1% level and globalization significant at the 5% level. We also reran this analysis focusing on dyads that do not involve the United States. The common-origin variable is as strong a predictor of convergence as before. Additionally, globalization is strengthened as a predictor, in magnitude and significance (1% level). This buttresses our finding of de jure similarity in governance among pairs of economically linked countries (especially when the United States is excluded).
C. Comparison with de Facto Analysis
In contrast to the de jure results, we find almost no evidence of de facto similarity between economically linked pairs of countries. As shown in table 4, of the eight measures that we test, the coefficients on three are of the wrong sign. Of the remaining five, only common language is significant, and merely at the 10% level. Common origin of the legal system is of the expected sign in all regressions, but, surprisingly, is not significant, indicating that this measure of path dependence is a poor predictor of governance enforcement. Difference in level of development is also of the expected sign in all regressions but not significant.
We are unable to implement the type of detailed analysis for the CLSA data that we used for the LLSV data, because the CLSA data cover only developing countries. We attempted a factor analysis of the economic integration proxies for just the developing countries, but the three factors were not easily interpretable.
The de facto and de jure results are not strictly comparable, because they are derived from different samples of countries. Most importantly, the de jure results are based on a sample that includes both developed and developing countries, whereas the de facto sample only contains developing countries. To address this problem, we perform an apples-to-apples comparison by running the regressions on just the nineteen countries for which we have both de facto and de jure data. These nineteen countries are all developing countries, where we expect to see the biggest difference between de facto and de jure results. Here, complementary institutions are weaker, political rent-seeking possibilities are greater, and enforcement of the rules is inadequate. As hard as it is to change the legal regime defining the rules of corporate governance, modifying actual practices to conform to these legal reforms under the political and economic circumstances found in most developing countries is an even greater challenge. Our results in table 5 confirm the hypothesis that there is a large gap between de facto and de jure similarity in developing countries. For this sample of countries, none of the coefficients in the de facto regressions are significant, and six of the eight coefficients are of the wrong sign. In contrast, in the de jure analysis all but one of the coefficients are of the right sign, and five of the coefficients are significant. Thus, our results still hold in the apples-to-apples sample of countries.
We summarize the results of the country-level analysis thus. We find evidence that economic interdependence and similarity in de jure corporate governance practices between pairs of countries are correlated, especially intraregionally, and especially among more developed countries. Estimation using regressors derived from a factor analysis confirms that globalization and similarity in corporate governance are correlated even after controlling for common origins. There is no such correlation between economic interdependence and de facto corporate governance practices, however. An interpretation of these results is that economically integrated countries have rules on books regarding corporate governance that are more similar than they would be if the countries were not as integrated; however, this similarity of rules on books does not transfer into similarity in practice. This interpretation is consistent with the findings in transition economies (Pistor et al., 2000) and regarding Mexican firms (Siegel, 2004) as well as regarding the importance of the process by which laws are implemented (Berkowitz, Pistor, & Richards, 2003) .
V. Robustness Checks
A problem with aggregating corporate governance ratings at the country level is that we ignore convergence along Each row represents a separate univariate dyadic regression utilizing one of eight proxies for pairwise economic integration as the explanatory variable. All regressions control for pairwise differences in log GDP/capita and for common origin of legal systems. The dependent variable in all regressions is the distance in corporate governance between two countries, which is calculated as the sum of differences along seven dimensions of corporate governance practices using CLSA firm-level data aggregated to the country level. The sample is all possible pairs of countries for which we have governance and pairwise economic integration data. The expected sign in the second column is based on the hypothesis that more economic integration leads to a smaller distance in governance.
industry and firm lines. In as much as most national laws apply to all firms and industries, de jure convergence is inherently a country-level phenomenon. On the other hand, de facto convergence can occur at the country, industry, or firm level. We show, using CLSA and other firm-level data sets, that de facto convergence is occurring at neither the industry level nor the firm level. We also investigate a number of political and economic factors at the country level that may explain why convergence is happening only between certain pairs of countries.
A. Similarity in Governance at the Industry Level
It has been argued that a different type of governance is appropriate for different types of industries. In skilled-laborintensive industries, it may be economically optimal to give labor greater control in the governance of the firm in order to induce labor to invest in acquiring firm-specific skills. Alternatively, corporate governance convergence may occur only in global industries, which would be more greatly affected by capital market, product market, and labor market integration.
We test for the role of industry in determining governance using the data from CLSA as well as three other sources of firm-level governance ratings as described in appendix D: Déminor, Proxinvest, and Fortune. Data from Déminor and Proxinvest, two independent consulting firms, provide governance ratings on the top 300 firms in Europe. Fortune magazine has rated firms worldwide in its World's Most Admired Companies Index.
If optimal governance structure differed by industry, then we would expect a regression of firm level governance indicators on industry and country dummy variables to find a significant role for industry. Appendix D displays the ANOVA decomposition of the four firm-level governance ratings (CLSA, Démi-nor, Proxinvest, and Fortune) into country and sector effects. Industry explains only 2% to 13% of the variance in corporate governance scores, while country explains 17% to 57%. The contrast in explanatory power is largest for the Déminor ratings, where country explains 29 times more variance than sector. The relatively small effect of industry casts doubt on industry-level explanations for the absence of de facto similarity in corporate governance.
For another robustness check, we tested separately the argument that more global industries have higher overall governance scores. This is effectively a test for similarity to U.S. corporate governance standards. For each industry, we compiled several measures of how global an industry is by aggregating data up from the firm level. Two of these measures were based on emerging-market data (namely, the propensity to list abroad and to export), and two other measures were based on U.S. and western European multinational activity. The advantage of the latter two variables is that they are exogenous because they are not related to the dependent variable, the corporate governance score of firms in emerging markets. For all four measures, we were able to reject the hypothesis that more global industries have governance closer to the U.S. system of governance.
B. Similarity in Governance at the Firm Level
Our sector categories in the industry-level analysis are quite broad, resulting in significant heterogeneity between firms in the same sector. For this reason, we conducted firm-level analyses as well. Mirroring some of our industrylevel analyses, we test whether firms that are more exposed to global markets have higher governance scores, after controlling for country and industry effects. We use three indicators of exposure to global capital markets, one indicator of exposure to global product markets, and one indicator of exposure to global labor markets. These variables are: institutional investor holdings, U.S. common stock or ADR listings, the use of global intermediaries, export in- These panels repeat the regressions of table 2 and table 4 , but restrict the sample in both panels to a common set of countries.
tensity, and proportion of foreign board members. Appendix E explains these variables in more detail. As with some of our industry-level analyses, the firmlevel analyses effectively look for correlations between exposure to global markets and de facto similarity to U.S. corporate governance standards. We find little evidence of a relationship between firm-level exposure to globalization and corporate governance. Regression results from the CLSA data are presented in appendix F. Although significant, the coefficient for U.S. listing is small. 20 The small size of the effect is consistent with Siegel's (2004) finding that ADR listings did not constrain Mexican companies with ADRs from expropriating minority shareholders. The institutional-ownership coefficient is significant at the 10% level in some of the regressions, and the coefficient is also small. The global-intermediary variables, representing whether the firm has had any connection with the big five accounting firms or major Western investment banks, are not significant. The export-intensity variable is not significant when we control for fixed country effects. The coefficient for foreign management and directors is significant at the 1% level, but the effect it represents is small. We have repeated this analysis for European countries using the Déminor data set and obtained similar results.
We have ignored the issue of causation so far, implicitly assuming that variables such as institutional investor holdings are exogenous and that higher institutional holdings would put more pressure on firms to change their governance practices. Instead, it is possible that a firm's corporate governance affects the size of institutional investor holdings. Knowing that they will be unable to affect corporate governance of the firms they invest in, institutional investors may decide to only invest in firms that already have good corporate governance. Because the coefficient on institutional investor holdings was small and not highly significant, however, we are able to reject either direction of causation as a significant force. Similarly, it may be that firms with better corporate governance tend to list in the United States rather than that listing in the United States causes firms to improve corporate governance; but the coefficient here was small as well. As long as both directions of causation lead to a coefficient of the same sign, our negative results still hold. 21 We also test for convergence along a more direct channel, that of pressure by controlling shareholders. We expected to find the greatest differences from country peers for those firms where the top shareholder is a U.S. firm or a U.K. firm but a regression analysis found no statistically significant effect. 22
C. Additional Explanatory Variables in the Country-Level Analyses
One explanation for why convergence may not happen despite competitive pressures is that vested interests capture political processes and prevent the adoption of needed reforms. We test this hypothesis first using data on the level of democracy in each country, hypothesizing that reform is more likely in democratic countries. We use three proxies for democracy (democracy index, political constraints index, and Gini coefficient) and test whether integration has a larger effect when the pair of countries are more democratic. The empirical results here are inconclusive. In as much as there is substantial disagreement in the academic literature regarding whether reform is more feasible under democracy or autocracy, the lack of a clear relationship in this case is not surprising. We repeat the analysis using a clearer proxy for the power of vested interests-union membership. We expect unions to oppose corporate governance reform intended to strengthen shareholder rights or creditor rights; for this reason, countries with a larger percentage of workers in unions should be less likely to reform. Surprisingly, the empirical analysis finds the opposite relationship. Similarity in governance due to integration was significantly greater in pairs of countries with high union membership. In a separate analysis, we test whether reform is more likely in countries that have recently experienced a currency crisis or received international aid. We find no significant evidence in support of either relationship.
VI. Conclusion
Theorists have debated the extent of convergence in corporate governance for some time now. Opinions span the spectrum from believers that global competition will force (and has already forced) such convergence (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001) , through more measured views that functional convergence rather than formal convergence will occur (Gilson, 2001) , to the idea that path dependence precludes the possibility of meaningful convergence (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999) . Others have drawn attention to the importance of distinguishing ruleson-the-book convergence from effective convergence, which we refer to in this paper as de jure and de facto convergence respectively (Pistor et al., 2000) . 20 Because a couple of the questions in the transparency section of the CLSA questionnaire related to requirements that would be imposed by the SEC or by exchange listing rules, the improvement in governance is probably accounted for by compliance with these regulations rather than indicative of a voluntary effort by firms to improve governance in order to attract U.S. investors. 21 If, on the other hand, poorly governed firms rather than well-governed firms were more likely to list in the United States because they needed to improve investors' perceptions of their governance practices, then we might obtain a negative result when in fact there were opposing forces along both directions of causation. 22 By searching Bloomberg and the Internet, we are able to identify the origin of the top shareholder for 235 of the 482 firms in the CLSA sample. Although most firms in our CLSA sample are locally owned, there are 13 firms where the top shareholder was a U.K. or U.S. firm. Of these 13 firms, 10 had a corporate governance rating greater than their country peers, and the remaining 3 had a lower rating. However, a fixed-country-effects regression of weighted corporate governance ratings on a dummy variable representing whether or not the top shareholder was a U.S. or U.K. firm yielded a positive but insignificant coefficient.
Yet these debates about the role of global competition in fostering convergence are generally not informed by systematic empirical inquiry. We conjecture that this is partly because of the difficulty of defining and operationalizing the notion of convergence. We take a small step in the direction of remedying this lack of literature. In particular, we amass several new data sets on de facto corporate governance practices of firms in several developed and developing markets. We contrast the de facto results from these data sets with a new use of the now ubiquitous La Porta et al. data on shareholder and creditor rights, which we interpret as indicators of de jure similarity, as Pistor et al. have justified convincingly in their analysis of transition economies. We try to be careful about what we mean by "globalization." In other words, we distinguish-with useful empirical implications, as it turns out-globalization as exposure to the U.S. system currently in ascendancy around the world, from globalization as economic interdependence between any pair of countries.
Our results, based on cross-sectional data, test the hypothesis that similarity in corporate governance between two countries is correlated with economic integration between those countries. This test for similarity is also a test for corporate governance convergence under certain conditions. First, complete convergence to one optimal standard must have not already occurred, for if such convergence had occurred, we would actually find no correlation between similarity in governance and integration. The heterogeneity in governance across countries demonstrates that this condition is met. Second, common origin of the legal system must be a sufficient control for the path dependence. If common origin does indeed sufficiently control for the point at which governance laws and practices started hundreds of years ago, then any common deviation from this starting point by economically interlinked countries is indicative of a convergence process.
Our conclusions challenge conventional wisdom. We find robust evidence of de jure similarity among economically interdependent countries. Interestingly, this is not driven by similarity to U.S. standards. Rather, pairs of economically interdependent countries appear to adopt common corporate governance standards, especially if the pair of countries in question are in the same geographic region and are relatively developed economies. In contrast to these de jure results, we find virtually no evidence of de facto similarity in corporate governance in a battery of estimations at the country, industry, and firm levels. This is consistent with either the proposition that complementarities result in different national systems appropriately having different corporate governance systems, or the proposition that globalization is not strong enough to overcome local vested interests. We conclude that globalization may have induced the adoption of some common corporate governance standards but that there is little evidence that these standards have been implemented. firm whether it had any of the following three types of scandals: shareholder expropriation, tax evasion, and price fixing.
We searched the India Business Insight database within Lexis-Nexis for articles about each of these 80 firms from the last two and a half years. According to Lexis-Nexis, this database has over 70,000 articles covering 30,000 companies, with coverage beginning on January 11, 1999. We manually scanned headlines of articles about our 80 firms for relevant stories and then read any such articles to determine if there indeed was a scandal and what type of scandal it was. For each firm we recorded the total number of articles found about that firm, which will serve as a control for the media attention devoted to that firm. Three types of scandals were recorded:
1. Shareholder Expropriation equals 1 if any shareholders have accused management of taking actions such as selling off assets, siphoning off funds, or insider trading, where management benefited at the expense of shareholders or majority shareholders benefited at the expense of minority shareholders. (Eight cases found.) 2. Tax Evasion equals 1 if the company has been raided or investigated for tax evasion or if a warrant has been issued in response to a failure to pay taxes. Does not include instances where certain deductions were ruled inappropriate by the courts or by the income tax department. (Three cases found.) 3. Price Fixing equals 1 if the company has been accused by the government of operating in a cartel to raise the prices of its products. (Four cases found, but all were related to one instance of price-fixing by four firms in our sample.)
Our search also found other types of scandals, but many of these occurred only once and were not as clear-cut cases of poor corporate governance. Probit regressions found that the shareholder expropriation index was correlated with the CLSA data but the tax evasion and price fixing indices were not.
APPENDIX B

Selection Issues in the CLSA Data
The CLSA sample contains 80 Indian firms with scores ranging from 37 to 93 on a 100-point scale. To examine the selection process that resulted in these firms showing up in the CLSA data, we select all Indian firms listed in Bloomberg with more than $20 million in market capitalization, producing a list of 301 firms. This pool contains 73 of the CLSA firms, with 5 left out because no market capitalization information was available and 2 left out because market capitalization was less than $20 million according to Bloomberg. Table B1 shows a probit regression testing the determinants of firm selection by CLSA. The coefficient of log assets, a proxy for firm size, is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that large firms are more likely to be included. U.S. listing and percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors are also significant at the 1% level. Exports/sales is positive, indicating that firms that sell to foreign markets are more likely to be selected, but the coefficient is not significant. Having a big five auditor increases the probability of selection and is significant at the 10% level. Not shown in the table is the fact that all Indian firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange were selected for inclusion. These results confirm the claim that CLSA selected large firms as well as firms that should be of interest to U.S. institutional investors.
APPENDIX C
QAP Estimation
An OLS regression with dyadic variables produces unbiased coefficients, but because the pairwise observations are not independent, OLS standard errors can be too small, leading to possible misinterpretations of spurious correlations. We use the quadratic assignment procedure (QAP), a technique developed for the analysis of dyads in networks (see, for example, Krackhardt, 1988) , to test the statistical significance of the regression coefficients. Our pairwise-dependent and -independent variables each form the lower triangle of a matrix where the rows and columns are countries. The QAP method involves scrambling the data so that the each dependent variable is randomly reassigned to a different observation. The OLS regression is run on the scrambled data, and new coefficient estimates are generated. Repeating this process 500 times generates a sampling distribution of the coefficient estimate under the null hypothesis. In order to preserve the interdependences in the rows and columns in generating the null distribution, the scrambling is accomplished by randomly permuting rows and columns of the matrix; the rows of the dependent variable are rearranged in a new, randomly assigned order, and the columns are rearranged in the same order. To assess statisticalsignificance, we compare the original coefficient estimate with the null distribution. If this coefficient falls in the upper or lower 2.5% of the distribution, then this coefficient is significant at the 5% level. Recent studies using QAP have carried out permutation and estimation steps from several hundred to over 1,000 times. Varying the number of repetitions from 500 has very little effect on our results. Table D1 shows the percentage of total variance in corporate governance ratings explained by country and sector dummy variables using partial sum-of-squares analysis of variance. The corporate governance ratings we use come from CLSA, Fortune, Déminor, and Proxinvest.
APPENDIX D
ANOVA Decomposition of Country and Industry Effects
In April 2001, CLSA released a large study of corporate governance entitled, "Saints and Sinners: Who's Got Religion?" which reviewed corporate governance at the firm level in 25 emerging markets. A firm's corporate governance score is based on responses to 57 yes no questions about various aspects of governance. The CLSA questionnaire is divided into seven sections covering fiscal discipline, accounting transparency and disclosure, board independence, board accountability, responsibility, equitable treatment of shareholders, and social awareness. The score for each of the seven sections is simply the percentage of questions receiving a yes answer in that section. The overall corporate governance score for the firm is a weighted average of the firm's scores in these seven sections.
Fortune magazine publishes an annual global list of most admired companies. To construct this list, firms from the Global 500 list of largest companies are separated by sector, and sectors dominated by firms from one country are removed. Every firm is sent a survey asking it to rate all of the other firms in its sector on a scale of 1 to 10 on eight characteristics: quality of management; quality of products and services; innovativeness; long-term investment value; financial soundness; ability to attract, develop, and retail talent; community responsibility; and use of corporate assets. A firm's "admired" score is simply the average of the scores over these eight characteristics. The variable Sales/Max Sales is included in the Fortune regressions to control for the portion of the admired score attributable to being the largest firm in the sector.
Déminor, an independent consultancy firm in Brussels, has rated 250 of the largest 300 European firms on over 70 governance indicators, which are grouped into four governance categories: rights and duties of shareholders, absence of takeover defenses, disclosure, and board structure. Because the board structure rating is not publicly available, the table uses the average of the first three. ProxInvest is a French proxy voting service, which calculated corporate governance ratings for 250 top European companies. It publicly discloses ratings for only the top-rated 100 of these companies. ProxInvest ratings are matched with Déminor subsector categories for this table.
APPENDIX E
Description of Explanatory Variables at the Firm Level
The firm-level empirical analysis will use three indicators of capital market globalization as well as two indicators of product market and labor market globalization: institutional investor holdings, U.S. common stock or ADR listings, the use of global intermediaries, export intensity, and proportion of foreign board members. All indicators are derived from Bloomberg firm data. Here we briefly explain each variable and cite the prior academic literature that has each one.
Institutional Investors
Bloomberg compiles data on the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional owners, mostly U.S. and U.K. mutual funds, based on documents that these organizations are required to file with the U.S. government. The role of shareholder activism in affecting governance and performance has been addressed by academics theoretically and studied empirically, with mixed results, by a number of researchers (Buxbaum, 1991; Black, 1992a Black, , 1992b Pound, 1993; Kissane, 1997; Opler & Sokobin, 1998; Gillan & Starks, 2000) .
U.S. Listing
We track whether each company's securities are traded in the U.S., either as American Depositary Receipts (ADR) or as underlying stock. Firms list in foreign capital markets to gain access to a different investor base, to aid product visibility, and to improve the predictability of an employee stock ownership plan (Merton, 1987; Saudagaran, 1988; Baker & Edelman, 1991) .
Capital Market Intermediaries: Auditors and Investment Banks
We code two binary variables for the regression analysis: whether the firm has a big five auditor and whether it recently placed an offering through a global investment bank. It is argued that the use of global rather than local intermediaries (such as big five accounting firms, top investment banks, and consulting firms) will facilitate convergence in corporate governance (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001 ).
Export Intensity
Our proxy for a firm's exposure to global product market competition is its export-to-sales ratio. We assume firms that do not report geographic segmentation data in their annual report have no exports, although that is not necessarily the case. Because the lack of disclosure of geographic segmentation can be correlated with poor governance, assuming nondisclosing firms have zero exports can bias the coefficient upward.
Foreign management and directors
Although we do not know the percentage of all employees that are foreign, we can estimate this figure for senior management and directors, as it is this class of employees that should have the strongest relationship with corporate governance. A sampling of the management and board of directors was taken using the first page of the Bloomberg management screen, which lists up to eighteen executives or directors. These names were manually scanned for instances of foreign first and last names. Although the list was scanned for any person whose name was clearly not from the region in which the firm is located, almost all of the foreign persons found were American. Firms in South Africa and the Philippines were not included in this sample, because of the difficulty of distinguishing foreign names for these countries. The table explores the effects of various types of global integration on a firm's governance score for firms in 24 emerging markets. The dependent variable is an overall governance score computed by averaging each firm's scores, as computed by CLSA, along seven dimensions of governance: fiscal discipline, accounting transparency and disclosure, board independence, board accountability, responsibility, equitable treatment of shareholders, and social awareness. In some cases not all seven dimensions are used, because one of the dimensions is based in part on an explanatory variable. One of the 10 questions in the equitable-treatment-of-shareholders section is whether foreign portfolio managers own more than 20% of the stock; this question is related to the institutional-ownership independent variable. Regressions that estimate the effect of this independent variable exclude this section of the survey in the dependent variable. Similarly, a question in the accountability section asks about the presence of foreign directors, which is related to our labor market variable.
Standard errors shown in parentheses. *Significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level.
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